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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, we have witnessed the introduction of a large
number of prepaid chipcard-based or software-based payment
schemes.1 These schemes, referred to as electronic money or
electronic cash, have given rise to a variety of regulatory responses

* Senior Policy Planner, Payment Systems Policy Department of De Nederlandsche Bank.
The views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect in any way a formal
position of De Nederlandsche Bank.
I would like to thank Heidi Richards of the Federal Board of Governors, Herman Lelieveldt
of the Department of Political Science of the University of Nijmegen, and Ian Grigg of Systemics
Ltd., for their reflections and comments.
1. SeeJustin Fox, Cyberbunk: What's New About DigitalCash?, FORTUNE, Sept. 30, 1996, at50
(describing proliferation of new technologies such as digital checks, Internet cash, and smart
cards).
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such as legislation,2 new policies,' and the revision of current rules
and regulations.4 As the dust of these developments is settling, it
now is possible to give an overview of regulatory issues and approaches that are relevant for supervisors of financial systems. For support,
this Essay will draw from the considerable amount of research
conducted by public sector organizations.
This Essay will describe the challenges that regulators face with
respect to electronic cash, the most important one being the
appreciation of its new and fundamentally different nature. Part I will
propose a functional definition that allows regulatory agencies to
better focus on the subject matter of electronic cash. Based on this
definition, Part II will outline the fundamental design features of
electronic cash, as well as a classification of electronic cash products
and the implementation aspects that are relevant for these products.
Part III will discuss the regulatory issues that are relevant from the
viewpoint of supervisors of the financial system. These issues can be
viewed as the goals of supervisors with respect to electronic cash as a
banking or payment product. To understand the context in which
these goals in practice must be achieved, Part IV will describe briefly
the differences in the regulatory framework between the United States
and Europe. Part V concludes that some of the differences of
opinion between regulatory authorities with respect to electronic cash
do not pertain to the goals achieved, but to the institutional arrange-

2. In Japan, the Prepaid Card Law was enacted in December 1989. See MOF to Implement
Prepaid Card Law Probably in September, COMLINE Daily News Tokyo Financial Wire, Feb. 13,
1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File. The law requires that card-issuing

companies register with the Minister of Finance and that deposit requirements apply to all cards
worth more than 1000 yen. See id.
3. In Europe, the report to the Council of the European Monetary Institute on pre-paid
cards (issued by the Working Group on European Union ("EU") Payment Systems in May 1994)
states that issuing prepaid cards could be considered deposit-taking and therefore would be
subject to supervision. SeeJohn Capper, EU Curbs Urged on Cash CardIssuers, FIN. TIMES, May 11,
1994, at 2 (reviewing study calling for limiting of authorization for electronic prepaid cards to

previously authorized credit unions). Consequently, EU member states have implemented (or
are implementing) this policy at the local level. See id.
(stating that most EU states already have
achieved limitation).

4. In the United States, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("FRB")
proposed amendments to the regulations regarding Electronic Fund Transfers. The FRB has

suggested that certain types of electronic cash be exempt from federal regulations that currently
apply to electronic fund transfers. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,696
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.1R pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996). The FRB's proposal would:

(1) completely exempt from regulations off-line unaccountable systems (where value is stored
only on the card); (2) exempt off-line accountable systems (where value is stored in the system
as well as on the card) from certain regulations pertaining to requirements of receipts and
periodic statements and error resolution procedures; (3) exclude all off-line systems that have
a maximum stored value of $100 at any given time; and (4) exclude on-line payment systems

from the periodic statement requirement, error resolution procedures, and change in terms
notice requirements. See id at 19,703.
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ments through which these goals must be achieved.' This would
seem to bode well for future agreement on the content of regulation
of electronic cash.
Table 1: Overview of Research and Policy Activities with Respect to
Electronic Cash
Year

Organization

Report or Activity

Hearings to examine the public policy implications of electronic money
and electronic cash
Sponsoring of colloquium on
cyberpayment systems at New York
University Law School
Comprehensive study of relevant
Nov. 1995 The central banks of the G-10 countries, assembled in the Bank for Inter- aspects of electronic money, resulting
in publication of two reports in 1996
national Settlements ("BIS")
Revision of 1988 recommendation on
Feb. 1996 European Commission ("EC")
electronic banking products
Revision of Regulation E
May 1996 Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ("FRB")
General Counsel's Opinion No. 8;
Aug. 1996 Federal Deposit Insurance CorporaStored Value Cards;
tion ("FDIC")
Hearing and public comments
Aug. 1996 European Monetary Institute ("EMI") Factfinding survey on electronic cash
schemes resulting in future update of
the 1994 report
Sept. 1996 United States Department of Treasury Conference about the role of government and formation of the Consumer
Electronic Money Task Force
Subcommittee on Domestic and
International Monetary Policy of the
U.S. House of Representatives
Sept. 1995 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN")

July 1995

I. ELECTRONIC CASH AND THE CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORS
One of the crucial challenges that regulators6 face when considering regulation of electronic cash is to acknowledge the fact that

5. SeeKim S. Nash, Cybercash atRisk: Money Laws Lacking, COMPUTWERORLD, Dec. 23,1996,
at 1-2 (describing hands-off policy stance of U.S. regulators with respect to electronic cash); see
also Tony Jackson, Cybennoney Gains Currency, Past and Future, FN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at 3
(describing desired policy of the Bundesbank to regulate electronic network money).
6. The term "regulators" will be used in this Essay to refer to the authorities at the
national or state level, as well as to those authorities at the supra-national level in Europe (such
as the European Commission, the European Monetary Institute, and the Bank for International
Settlements) and the federal level in the United States (such as the Federal Board of Governors,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Department of Treasury, and Congress).
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electronic cash constitutes a fundamentally new class of electronic
payment instruments. Although electronic cash products such as
Mondex,7 Proton,' and Digicash 9 build on current payment systems
technology, this does not necessarily imply that regulation for
electronic cash also should build on the current regulation for
(electronic) payments. One should start by reconsidering the subject
of electronic cash and the developments that influence it.
First, in electronic cash schemes, the security concept for transferring electronic value is based on the possession of a payment device,
whereas for conventional payment instruments such as debit cards
and credit cards, the knowledge of a secret number or the use of a
signature is the key to transferring value. As a result, a different legal
regime will apply to electronic cash; that is, one in which liability
originates from the use of the payment device instead of the use of
a Personal Identification Number ("PIN") or signature. The fact that
the security and legal frameworks of electronic cash are built upon
physical possession is something that must be acknowledged when
regulating electronic cash.
For example, the four-digit purse-codes that are used for loading
electronic cash do not have to be kept as secret as the PINs that are
used in debit-card systems, because the physical possession of the
device protects the value, rather than the purse-code. Prescribing that
these purse-codes must be kept completely secret therefore would not
make a difference from a legal or security point of view.
Second, developments in information technology will continue to
influence strongly the design of future electronic cash systems.
Consequently the technical implementations of electronic cash
systems will change frequently. It is required that the regulation of
electronic cash should not be based on the actual technical imple-

7. Mondex is a smart card invented by National Westminster Bank. The card stores
amounts of money that can be used like cash. See Nick Gardner, High Tech CardsPoised to Render
Cash Obsolete, TIMES (London), Dec. 12, 1993, at 16.
8. Proton, a Belgian smart card affiliated with American Express, can store and transfer
monetary value. See American Express PlansSmart-Card Projec4 N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1996, at D6.
9. Digicash, an on-line system developed by David Chaum, allows an Internct user, with
credit cards or other conventional banking forms, to purchase a certain amount of E-cash that
can be used to purchase goods and services on the Internet without the need for exchanging
credit card information with each vendor. See Peter Lewis, Attention Internet Shoppers: E-Cash Is
Her N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at D4.
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mentation of an electronic cash product but on its essential design
features.
Third, as information technology will account not only for rapid
changes in technological implementations but also for changes in
other areas of the system design, regulators might want to investigate
specifically the future changes in system design and the resulting
Such an
consequences in terms of any proposed regulation.
way, for
asystematic
in
performed
best
is
investigation or exploration
on
Payment
example by using the model described by the Committee
and Settlement Systems and the Group of Computer Experts of the
central banks."
The model distinguishes the following three domains: (1) the
clearing and settlement domain, in which financial institutions, clearing
houses, and the central bank fulfill the interbank financial obligations
resulting from electronic value transactions; (2) the issuing/acquiring/operatingdomain, in which a structure is established for
issuing and acquiring electronic value as well as for interacting with
the clearing and settlement domain; and (3) the retail domain,in which
the following actual value transfers between users take place: loads
(transfers of value from the issuer to users), payments (transfers of
value between users and retailers), and deposits (transfers of value
from retailers to acquirers)."
This model would seem to provide for a useful exploration of policy
issues in each of the domains:
* Would a given scheme have to be supervised if the settlement
structure were based on the debit card or credit card settlement
system?
* Would deposit insurance apply to the electronic value in the
scheme if the scheme operator resides offshore?
* Should a separate regulatory framework be developed for
scheme operators of electronic cash, regardless of the acquiring and
issuing or clearing and settlement arrangements?
• What would be the consequences of cross-border acceptance of
the electronic value, represented on the devices, distributed to
consumers?
Fourth, the legal classification of electronic cash schemes should
not originate only from the observed system design because the
developers of new schemes may want to apply new and different legal

10. COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS & GROUP OF COMPUTER EXPERTS,
CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
SECURfIY OF ELEcTRONIc MONEY 35 (1996).

11.

See id.
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concepts to their schemes. For example, if we suppose that the
representation of value is present not only on the payment device, but
also at the facility of the scheme operator, classifying either record as
the money is an arbitrary legal choice. It even might be decided that
the representation of value does not constitute money in a legal sense
but still serves to fulfill irrevocably a legal obligation.12 Although
there hwill be a relationship between the system design and the legal
regime applied, this regime should not be derived from the system
design alone.
In summary, the challenges facing regulators of electronic cash are
substantial. Regulators should observe the fact that the key to
transferring electronic cash is the possession of a payment device,
instead of the knowledge of a secret or a signature. Furthermore,
regulators should expect a variety of technically different electronic
cash schemes. As a result, regulators will have to decide on more
functionally defined regulations to prevent developments in information technology from rendering regulations obsolete within a short
period of time. If one defines electronic cash as "the electronic
representation of prepaid value on a device," regulators may be able
to design rules and policies that allow for a more unconstrained
technological development of electronic cash schemes.
II.

IMPLEMENTATION ASPECrS OF ELECTRONIC CASH

Building on a definition of electronic cash as an electronic
representation of prepaid value, one could define the basic design
features of electronic cash as twofold: (1) the way in which the value
is represented-as a balance only, a balance in combination with a
series of certificates (electronic checks), or coins and notes; and (2)
the possibility to transfer value between users without mandatory
interaction with the issuer of electronic cash (one-time respectively
multiple circulation). The fundamental technical requirements for
both devices and payment protocols in an electronic cash scheme are
dictated to a large extent by these two design features. These design
features also serve as a good basis for classification of electronic cash
schemes.

12. See R.E. de Rooy, Dechipknip: een (juridische)vei*enning,NEDERLANDSJURISTENBLAD, Apr.
5, 1996, at 509-13 (explaining that this solution has been chosen by both card schemes in the
Netherlands and describing other possible legal qualifications).
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Table 2: Classification of Electronic Cash Schemes
Value Representation

C
0

One time circulation:

Balance

Balance and
Certificates

Notes or Coins

Avant, Visa-cash
Cash, Clip
Chipknip Chipper,
SIBS Danmont
Geldkarte,

CAFE-Wallet

Cybercash Digicash

EMS (Citibank)
NTT system

-

Mastercard Proton
Multiple circulation:

Mondex
I

The actual technical appearance of electronic cash systems also is
determined by additional implementation decisions that include the
following: (1) the physical form of the device (card, software on a
PC, a wallet); (2) the possibility that part of the device will be used for
other purposes (multifunctionality); (3) the limitation of value
transfers between certain types of users (consumer-retailers, any one
user to the other); (4) the possibility of currency conversion and
currency exchange; (5) the possibility of storing more than one
representation of value (multiple currencies); (6) the registration of
all transactions in either the device, the operator database, or both;
(7) the existence of duplicate representations of the value on each
device elsewhere in the payment scheme (shadow administration); (8)
the traceability of payments to one particular device; and (9) the
registration of personal information on the device (privacy).
As the technical appearance easily may be changed during the
lifetime of an electronic cash scheme, the use of these additional
characteristics for classification or regulation purposes poses a certain
risk. The proposed amendments of Regulation E by the FRB, for
example, distinguish between on-line and off-line systems.13 The
European Commission has proposed a similar technology-dependent
approach by formulating rules that do or do not involve the use of a
card as a payment device. Both proposals have the tendency to be
oriented too much toward the implementation of the electronic cash
product. It will be interesting to observe how these proposals develop
further.

13. SeeElectronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,699 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
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REGULATORY ISSUES

This Essay focuses on the question of how electronic cash should
14
be considered and treated by supervisors of the financial system.
The regulatory issues involved are the safety and soundness of
electronic cash schemes, the applicability of deposit insurance
schemes, and the cross-border provision and use of electronic cash.'"
There seems "to be consensus among regulators that supervisory
authorities should be concerned particularly with the safety and
soundness of electronic cash. 6 Their primary role, therefore, would
be to investigate whether an electronic cash scheme is being
developed and operated in a safe and sound manner. The focus of
these investigations would be to determine how a scheme operator is
establishing and managing the risks involved with the system. For
instance, the legal and contractual relationships of participants in an
electronic cash scheme should be defined adequately. A loss-sharing
arrangement may have to be agreed on by all participating institutions
to manage the effects of a default of one participant in the scheme.
As for the technical operations, scheme operators should be able to
provide both a security policy and a thorough risk analysis. The risk
analysis could be done by an external expert to prevent the commercial interests of project participants from interfering with security
interests.
The applicability of deposit insurance rules to electronic cash will
depend on the specific laws and regulations of a country. The
applicability of these rules often requires that the funds involved
remain under the control of the customer in his or her personal
account. Electronic cash systems, however, mostly involve the use of
numbers instead of names. Furthermore, electronic cash might be
loaded anonymously by the physical deposit of notes. It therefore is
quite probable that in most countries deposit insurance would apply
only to those prepaid cards that draw directly on a personal account
instead of on a pooled account of funds.' 7

14.

Other issues that are relevant for regulators are consumer protection, interoperability

of products, and possible use of electronic money for criminal purposes. See Paul Howcroft,
Future Law andReglation of Pre-PaidCards,EUROPEAN FIN. SERVs. L, Apr. 1996, at 113-16.
15.

SeegeneraUyBANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL BANKS

OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONEY (1996).
16. See id.
17. See FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490,
40,494 (1996) (setting forth FDIC's legal opinion regarding proper treatment of funds
underlying stored value cards for purposes of qualifying for federal deposit insurance).
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Finally, the cross-border provision for the use of electronic cash
constitutes a future issue of concern for supervisors. To date, most
electronic cash schemes are limited to single countries in which local
banks manage. the float of the scheme. This allows for a clear
determination of applicable laws and supervisory agencies. A more
complicated situation could arise, however, if a credit institution
established in country A provides electronic cash to citizens of country
B and manages the float of that scheme -in country18 C, and the
operator of that scheme resides offshore in country D.
IV. A LIMITED COMPARISON OF CURRENT REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PAYMENT PROCESSES IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE

Regulators generally are in agreement that electronic cash should
be subject to supervision. 9 Because of the differences in existing
institutional frameworks, however, supervision has taken different
forms. As an illustration, this section provides a limited comparison
of the regulatory framework in both the United States and Europe
with respect to banking and payment products.
A.

Regulation of FinancialInstitutions and Payment Products in the
United States

The regulation of the financial industry in the United States focuses
both on banking institutions and on payment products, such as
money orders. A wide range of laws and regulatory and supervisory
agencies exists, depending on the intended goals of such legislation.2" Although the number of laws and rules may be quite
confusing, they often are confined to a clearly outlined purpose."
18. It will not be easy to determine which banking supervision law applies to such a
transaction. The definitions used in these laws also may vary among countries, which may result
in requiring the scheme operator to be a bank under the banking supervision law of country
B, although the operator would not have to be a bank under.the supervision law of country C.
19.

See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity,

Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 496 (1996) (pointing to tension
between free speech, anonymity, and electronic cash regulation); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Legal and TechnologicalInfrastructuresforElectronicPayment Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
LJ. 1, 30-31 (1996) (stating that law must respond to risk of dishonor and forgery in electronic
payment systems).
20. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994) (stating that Congress intended to strengthen financial
institutions and to give consumer protection of various credit terms available by informed use
of credit); 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (1994) (requiring registration of any money-transmitting business
with Secretary of Treasury even if licensed in state).
21. For examples of such laws, see the National Bank Act, the Federal Reserve Act, the
Banking Act of 1933, the Banking Act of 1935, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act of 1991, the Depository Institutions Disaster ReliefAct of 1992, and
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A superficial survey of the regulation of financial instruments in
U.S. law illustrates that rules have been established for specific
violations.22 As for payment system risk reduction, a separate
provision exists to eliminate systemic risk as a result of netting
systems. 23 Under consumer credit protection, there are rules for
credit cards, 24 regulations for transferring electronic funds, 25 and

limitations on federal credit unions.26
Regulation of payments exists not only at the federal level but also
at the state level. 27 In fact, forty-five states regulate businesses that
wire-transfer cash or sell travelers checks, money orders, or other
instruments for the transmission of money.28 These businesses must
obtain a state license to conduct business. 29 To be licensed, the
applicant must demonstrate that the business will operate in a safe
and sound manner." In addition, fourteen states require that
licensees maintain investments such as cash, CDs, or bonds equal to
the amount of outstanding payment instruments, and many require
that the investor is of a minimum net worth."1
B. Regulation of FinancialInstitutions and Payment Products in Europe

The regulation in Europe focuses mainly on banking institutions
and in some cases on payment products. Regulation of payment
products is not so elaborate as in the United States, which could be
due to the fact that in Europe, in contrast with the U.S. tradition of
statutory regulation by independent boards and commissions, the
primary mode of economic regulation historically has been public

the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. For an example of a
state law that establishes a system of safe and reliable banking by creating secure depositories
as needed by the business public, see N.Y. BANKING LAW § 1 (McKinney 1990).

22. For example, Postal Service employees may not issue money orders if they have not

received payment from the purchaser. See 18 U.S.C. § 1713 (1994) (imposing fine for officer
or employee of Postal Service who issues money order prior to receiving payment).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 4401 (establishing legally binding netting procedures to reduce risk
found in banking system and financial markets).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666f (forbidding card issuer from prohibiting retailer from offering
discount to cardholder by contract or other means). The debate on this issue in Europe still
has not been resolved.
25. See id. § 1693.
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (restricting membership and its rights to groups that share
common bond of occupation, association, or community).
27. See Ezra C. Levine, The Regulation of Check Sellers and Money Transmitters, CwIL REMEDIES
INDRUG ENFORCEMENT REPORT, (Nat'l Ass'n ofAtt'ys Gen.), Mar./Apr. 1993, at 12-13. Ezra C.
Levine, New LaunderingConcerns: Safety in Cyberspace,MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Oct. 1995, at
1, 1-3 [hereinafter Levine, New Laundering Concerns].
28. See Levine, New LaunderingConcerns, supra note 30, at 2.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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ownership. 2 Many European governments have in the past provided
payment and savings facilities to the public through the governmentowned and operated "giro-systems." By actively owning and operating
these giro-systems, governments achieve regulatory goals such as a
safe, inexpensive, and widely available payment and savings products
for their citizens.
Although many of these government-owned giro-systems have been
privatized, the governments of countries in which this privatization
has taken place have not established regulation to ensure, through a
system of supervision, that their regulatory goals remain to be
achieved in the future. As a result, separate supervisory laws with
respect to the safety and soundness of payment instruments have not
developed fully.
Table 3: Classification of the Regulatory Framework in European
Countries with Respect to Supervision of Payment Instruments
Type of Regulation:

Countries:

No explicit
supervision of
payment instruments
defined in
legislation.
Austria, Denmark,
Greece, Ireland,
Luxemburg,
Netherlands

Defined (or plan to
define) issuance of
payment instruments
as a banking activity,

Separate supervision
of payment
instruments defined
in legislation.

Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany,
Sweden

Italy, Portugal

Source: EMI, Apr. 1996.

When the first pre-paid, multi-purpose card schemes began
operating in 1993, European central banks were faced with the
question of whether these schemes would fall within their supervisory
authority. Given a regulatory framework in which supervision of
payment products had not been designated explicitly to independent
institutions or to central banks, and given the desire to control and
monitor the developments with respect to pre-paid cards, 3 a solution

32.

For informative papers on the differences between regulation in Europe and in the

United States, see GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN FEDERAL TYPE SYSTEMS
(EUI Working Paper No. 93/1); GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, CONTROLLING REGULATORY
BUREAUCRACIES: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (EUI Working Paper No. 93/3);
GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, WHEN DOES POLICY DELIBERATION MATTER?, (EUI Working Paper No.
93/12); and GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATORY GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (EUI Working Paper No. 94/17); see also REGULATING EUROPE (Giandomenico

Majone ed., 1996).
33. In a lecture for the IBIT Forum in Basle on June 11, 1996, Wendelin Hartmann, a
member of the Directorate of the Deutsche Bundesbank, stated: "Consequently, the EU central
banks have agreed as an initial step to ensure, above all, that this development is subject to
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was found that is described in the 1994 EMI report. 4 Based. on the
argument that every pre-paid, multi-purpose card scheme by definition involves the process of taking deposits, the supervisory authority
of central banks and supervisory agencies with respect to electronic
cash was established or re-confirmed.

V. FUTURE REGULATORY STRATEGIES
The actual policies of regulators with respect to electronic cash will
vary from country to country. Regulators in nations that currently do
not have a legal basis on which they can supervise payment instruments may be in a position such that existing banking laws allow
electronic cash to be subject to supervision. The alternative would be
to enact separate laws governing the supervision of electronic cash.
For regulators who have a legally firm basis for supervision of
payment instruments (such as most of the regulators in the United
States, Canada, Italy, and Portugal), the basic question will be how to
read, adapt, interpret, change, or reformulate the existing rules. 5
These countries may need only to reword or eliminate the rules that
are based on technical solutions rather than on functional processes.
The particular form of the regulatory strategy therefore will differ
as a result of the countries' various regulatory backgrounds. The
following regulatory strategies may be chosen: (1) the ad hoc strategy,
in which a separate law or regulation will be established to regulate
electronic cash; (2) the goal-orientedst-rategy, in which separate laws and
regulatory agencies serve to achieve separate supervisory goals; or (3)
the integratedstrategy, in which different supervisory goals are achieved
by the use of the same regulatory framework.

control. In all EU countries, therefore, legal initiatives have been set in motion, as a result of
which only credit institutions which are subject to banking supervision will be allowed in future
to issue multi-purpose prepaid cards."
34. WORKING GROUP ON EU PAYMENT SYSTEMS, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
MONETARY INSTITUTE ON PREPAID CARDS (May 1994).

35. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary
Policy of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, formulated four guiding principles to
direct appropriate government responses with respect to technological developments: (1) the
government should intervene only when there is a clear need to advance the public interest; (2)
the government should articulate the public policy goal and permit the private sector to develop
the means to pursue that goal; (3) the government should be extremely wary of imposing
requirements solely for its administrative convenience; and (4) the regulatory infrastructure must
be maintained and modernized to remain up-to-date. See The Futureof Money, Part M.h Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic andIn'lIMonetaryPolicy of the Comm. on Banking & in. Sers., 104th

Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of Hon. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency)
(summarizing desired attitude for regulators that operate in well-regulated environment).
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.Despite these different implementation strategies, the content of
future regulation will have to be similar. The future international
nature of electronic cash schemes simply does not allow for applicable
regulations to be too different. International cooperation between
regulators therefore should focus on the formulation of a set of
minimum requirements to be implemented through one of the above
strategies. 36

36. See Henny van der Wielen, Deputy Director of the Central Bank of the Netherlands,
Electronic Money- A European Perspective, Address Before the London Bankers Club (Feb. 4,
1997).

